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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH

ROBEHT A. THO:\IPSON,
HERBERT RICHEY, and
:\IARIE RICHEY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
YS.

Case No.
11905

KYLE H. BRE\VSTER and
"lOX ARC II LOAX CO"IP AXY.
I XC., a t•tah Corporation.

Defendants and. \ppcllr111t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

XATL'RE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to certain
real property located in Tooele County, State of Utah.
Defendant hy way of' answer and counterclaim denied
the allegations eontained in plaintiffs' complaint and
demanded repossession of the premises together with
damages.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COCUT
Prior to the start of the trial, default of ~lonarch
Loan Company, Inc., was entered and the court explained to Mr. Papenfuss, the President of ~lonareh
Loan Company, that entry of the default meant that
said loan company's interests would be subordinate and
inferior to any interests which the court might find in
the plaintiffs. The remainder of the issues between
plaintiffs and the defendant Brewster were tried to
the court with legal issues being disposed of in written
memoranda submitted by counsel for said parties to
the court. The district court granted judgment for
the plaintiffs-respondents, quieting title to said property in them, and dismissed the defendant-appellant's
counterclaim, no cause of action.

RELIEF SOCGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant Brewster has taken this appeal and
has requested the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
to reverse the judgment of the lower court and to
remand the case for retrial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
\Vith the exception of certain factual statements
contained on pages 2 and 3 of appellant's brief, respondents admit the facts as stated by appellant. This
Honorable Court's attention is drawn, however. to
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certain ~tateme11ts ma<le Ly appellant on pages :l and
:J ot' his 1irief. On page :l of his Lrief, appellant indicatl:s that the down payment paid on the property
which is the subject of this law suit, amounted to
!)i:W,l OU as recited in the contract.
Although that is
technically true, the clear implication of this stateme11 t is that such downpayment was made in the form
of cash as stated in the contract. Appellant's own testi111011y demonstrates, however, that the actual cash
downpayment consisted of approximately $100.00.
Tlw remainder of the downpayment was made by the
exchange of a piece of property (Tr. 110-11). A close
reading of appellant's testimony with reference to this
property L"xchanged as the downpayment clearly indicates that at best, the value of said property as set in
the contract was highly speculative (Tr. 112-20).
At the bottom of page :l and the top of page 3
of appellant's brief. appellant contends that he may
nut have been in breach of the contract and that at
best. the record is confused on this point. It is submitted that the confusion exists only in the appellant's
min<l and not in the record. The $4,100 figure referred
to by appellant was arri,·ed at in settlement of a controversy which arose when respondents had, on a prior
occasion. taken possession of the subject property from
the appellant upon an alleged breach of the contract
(Exhibit I'-:! and Tr. :!7-:!8). A settlement letter acknowledged by )Ir. Knowlton, the attorney for the
:1;)pl'lla11t. ~tated that the $4.100 figure was to be credited to the "unpaid balance owing on the contract"
3

(Exhibit P-2). It is clear that there was never any
intent that $4,100 change hands. It was merely a bookkeeping entry crediting $4,100 toward the unpaid con.
tract balance due and owing by the appellant. That is
exactly whta was done by the respondents. The testimony of Marie L. Richey, one of the respondents, clearly indicates that the full $4,100 was credited to the
appellant's account. No deductions were made from
that figure (Tr. 37).
On page 3 of appellant's brief, appellant alleges
that respondents did not wait a full five days after
serving the appellant with a notice to quit before taking
possession of the property. It should be noted that the
exact day on which respondents retook possession of
the property is not clearly established in the record.
The respondent Thompson testified that he thought
it was around the 20th or the end of the month but that
he was not certain as to the date (Tr. 8-9). The testimony of Joyce .Mead, who was on the premises at
the time .Mr. Thompson took possession of them, testified only that her best recollection was that the date
.Mr. Thompson retook possession of the premises was
around the 20th (Tr. 106). Neither .Mr. Thompson's
testimony nor the testimony of Mrs. .Mead firmly
establishes the date as September 20.
Even though respondents admit that the remainder
of the facts stated by appellant in its brief are true,
respondents do not beliew that the facts as stated by
appellant are sufficient to provide this Honorable
4

Court with the proper perspective. Therefore, re·
-,pu11<lP11b recite other additional facts which respondent-. belie,·e to be pertinent:
011 or about September "27, 1967, the respondents
a11<l appellant entered into a uniform real estate contract for the purchase of respo11dents' leasehold interest
in eertai11 real property located in Tooele County, State
of Utah. The contract recited minimum payments in
the amow1t of $tl00 per month beginning October 15,
"J tHii. and eontinuing thereafter on the fifteenth day
of eaeh month. The appellant also agreed to pay one
twelfth of the annual charges for taxes, lease, rent,
tire awl liability insuranee, garbage, water, and sewer
charges ( R. I). As a practical matter the one twelfth
of said expenses figured out to $300 per month
and the payments under the contract were made via
two checks, one for $900 and one for $300. The payme11 ts were made to the Security Bank of 'Vashington, Ephrata, "'ashington, where the payments were
eredited to an escrow account (Tr. 25 and 134-36).

J a11uary HH..i8, respondents took possession of
the subject property claiming a default under the contract 011 the part of appellant (Tr. 11). Appellant
brought legal aetion to regain possession of the property and the property was ultimately turned back
the appellant on or about )lay 15, 1968, as a result
of negotiation between the respectin attorneys for
appella1it and respondents (Tr. 11 and i.H). On Septt-111ber -i.. 1HOH, appellant was personally sened with
111
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a five day notice reqmrmg him to either pay certain
claimed deficiencies under the contract or be subject
to the forfeiture provisions provided therein l Exhibit
P-5). Appellant thereafter received by certified mail
a notice of Declaration of Forfeiture of Contract dated
September 10, 1968, in which appellant was declared
a tenant at will and was given five days to vacate the
premises. Appellant received said notice on September
16, 1968 (Exhibit P-6).
On or about September :W, 1968, the respondent
Thompson went to the property and tried to locate
appellant. Upon failing to do so, he took possessiou
of said property (Tr. 20). Appellant was advised oi
this fact (Tr. 106) and although he visited the property
approximately five times in the next six weeks (Tr.
87) he never contacted anyone on the premises or
ever made any complaint to the respondents about his
alleged illegal dispossession of the property (Tr. 8i).
On or about December ti, 1968, appellant tiled a
chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding claiming in the schedules therein that he still had some interests in the subject property ( R. 14). On April a, 1969, respondents
initiated this action to quiet title to said property i11
themselves ( R. 1) . Appellant counterclaimed alleging
that the possession of the property by the respondents
was wrongful and claiming damages as a result thereof ( R. 5). On .June 17, 19()9, appellant tiled a )lotion
to Stay Proceedings based upon his pending bankruptcy ( R. 14). The motion was denied by the court
(Tr. 2-3).
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Tlie trial eourt expressly fuun<l that the appellant
11 a-. in default under the contract in failing to make
,·nta111 required payments (H. u at pp. a-4). That
ti11di11g "as based 011 the following facts clearly estab1ished by the record.

The aetual payment clue eaeh month, including one
twelfth of the taxes and other expenses was $1,198.05
Exhibit P-1). During the time that appellant was
aetually ill pos!-iession before the respondents first retook IH1!-i-.essio11 - Oetober 15, 1967, to January, 1968
- appellant owed payments un<ler the contract amounting to ~4,i!J:!.:W (Exhibit P-1). As of that date, appellant had paid 011ly )\;:2,:J:J-1-,15 (Exhibit P-1). Between
.January I.3. HHi8, and April 1.5, 1968, an additional
three payments amounting to :\i3,594.15 fell due (Exhibit P-1). On .January :29, 1908, after respondents
had gone into possession, an additional $1,436.02,
which amounted to the rent receipts collected by re.,po11dents, was credited to appellant's account (Exhibit l'-1 and Tr. :27). On April 16, 1969, the respel'tiYc counsel for appellant and respondents signed
a letter agreement and stipulation in which the parties
agreed to settle a law suit initiated by appellant against
rl'spo11denh to redaim possession of the property (Exhibit P-:2). Said agreement provided that the appellant was to be credited with an additional $.t.,100 to
he applied toward the unpaid balance due and owing
1111 the rn11trad ( Exhihit P-:2). This was accomplished
a, per th<' agreement (Exhibit P-1 ) . Therefore, as of
had become due and
. \ pn·1 1-.J. l'I''"
• •In. so 111e l118.:l81i.:!5
·r
I
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owing under the contract. Appellant had either paid
or been credited with $7,870.15 leaving a deficiency
due and owing as of that date of $516.18.
Between April 15 and May 15, the date upon
which appellant retook possession of the property, respondents collected another $1,4tiJ in rents from the
property (Tr. 28-29). Some $340.42 of this amount
was expended by respondents for necessary repairs and
expenses in maintaining the property (Tr. 29-30 and
37-38) leaving $1,124.58 credited against the payment
of $1,198.05 due on )lay 15 (Exhibit P-1). \Vitl1
reference to the June 15 and July 15 payments appellant was credited with $900 each month (Exhibit P-1)
the $300 payments for each of those months ha,·ing
been returned from the bank marked insufficient funds
(Tr. 29). Between April 15 and July 15, appellant
owed respondents under the contract an additional
$3,594.15. During that period of time, appellant either
paid or was credited with $2,924.58 leaving an additional deficiency of $669.57 (Exhibit P-1). \Vhen added to the deficiency as of April 15 in the amount of
$516.18, the total deficinency under the contract as
of July 15 was $1,185.75. The $900 and $300 checks
sent by appellant to respondents to make the August
payment under the contract were both returned marked
insufficient funds (Tr. 135-31)). Respondents then
contacted their attorney concerning the deficiency owed
by the appellant (Tr. 30) .
The uniform real estate contract provided in para-
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gra pli l tia tlia t ii' auy amouut <lue under the co11tract
rc111:1111c<l deli11<111l'11t for more than :JO <lays, seller
l't n, id g i' c buyer notice of sai<l delinquency informi11g
11.v l1t1~ n that tl1e <lelirnp1ent amount either Le paid
"it lii11 ti 1 e days or the cuutrad would Le forfeited
I H. 1 I. ~\ppellant was sened with such a notice on
Septemlicr -1, 1 \lliH (Exhibit P-5). On September Hi,
I !HiH. appt:llanl recei,·ed a secon<l 11otice indicating that
dtw tci his failurt' to comply with the 11otice of September -1 and pay the amount <luc thereunder, the
l'untract "as forfrite<l and he was a tenant at will. The
notil'l' gan· the appellant tiYe days to rncate the premise-. (Exhibit P-6) .
.:\ppellant testified at the trial that he thought he
had sent two checks, one for !t\!100 an<l one for $300,
"ithin the ti Ye day period provided for in the September
-1 notice. I lm\·e,·er, the appellant could nut recall the
exact dates ou which the checks were made out or sent
(Tr. li\I). The uncontro,·erted testimony of .James A.
(rordon, the \"ice President and Branch ~lanager of
the Secmity Bank of \\"<1shi11gto11, Ephrata, \\'ashington, niakes this entire matter clear. ~Ir. Gurdon was
t I 1e one at the hank who took care of the escrow account
under the contract (Tr. l:J-t.-:rn). On September 2J,
l!HiH. the hank receiwd two cheeks from the appellant,
rn1e for ~!100 and one for ~:wo. The d1ecks were dated
Scptl'mhn :.!:! and were the on!~· checks receive<l by
I Ill' bank after the September -t. notice (Tr. l:J7). Prior
t 11 t I w rt'('l'i pt of t ht>se two <'hecks, :\Ir. Gordon had
1T\'l·i1 l d 11<1tit'l' "f the i11te11t t" forfeit the contract
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(Tr. 137) and considered the escrow account closed
(Tr. 138). By inadvertence, the escrow clerk at the
bank had sent these two checks in for collection (Tr
137) . As usual, the $300 was returned for i11suff icie11t
funds (Tr. 138). The $900 check cleared and the bank
attempted to return that money to appellaut on three
different occasions by certified check (Tr. 138-39). This
$900 check was never applied to the escrow account in
behalf of the appellant (Tr. 140).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT \VAS NOT EN'TITLED TO A
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS BASED CPON HIS
PENDING CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDING.
Section 11 of the bankruptcy act, 11 C.S.C.A. §:rn
( 1946) provides that a stay of proceedings is appropriate only where the suit is
founded upon a claim from which a discharge
would be a release and which is peuding against
a person at the time of the tiling of a petition
by or against him . . . .
Is this such a claim! 1 t clearly is not. Section 60()
of the Act, 11 U.C.A. §1006 ( 19.J.6) in defining claims
affected by a chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding excludes all claims "secured by estates in real property
or chattels real .... " That same section goes on to de10

ti11t· ;i credit()r as "a l1ol<lcr of a11y daim." lu i11ter1m·t 111µ: tl1e 1rltimate effect of this section, the courts
i 1a \ t· dearly indicated that a elaim secured by real
prnpl·rt~ is (ltlbide the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
t'llt1rt ll11der a Chapter 1:3 proceedi11g. Fur example,
ir 1 tlw decisirn1 of I 11 rdlal/e11ucck, "211 F. Supp. 60~,
I U. \.a. I !lti"2 1. the court held that nut uuly was the
l'lain1 (llilsidt· tlit: j11risdidio11 oi the court, but that the
'l'l't1red property ''as abo outside the jurisdiction uf
the lia11krupky court.
Tl1t: pres<:11t action tJll appeal before this l'.ourt
i11\ ()h t·s a 1111iform real estate l'.untract which is by its
\Try 11at11re a security agreement, the security under
the eo11 tract c( lllsis ting of real property. This is, therefore. thc \ery typt: of claim which is excluded by secl1lJ11 tillli of the Bankruptey Act under a chapter 13
prueeedi11g. _.\s a result. respondents· claim would 11ot
Ill' tlisdiarged by the ha11kruptcy proceeding and pru,·ides. t lierefore. 110 grounds for a stay under section
11. This was. i11 fact. the exact decision reached by both
the hankrutey eomt and the district euurt in this action.
The record i'i dear that 011 December "27, 1968, the
resptl1H.le11b were required to appear before the bankrnpll'y rnmt and . . how cause. if a11y they had, why they
,Ji.,11ld not he required to desist in their efforts to retake
pm.,t·-.-,io11 of the property. That order was dismissed
liy tlic ha11krnptcy eourt. the referee indicating that the
lia11krnplc~· proceedi11µ: in llll way affected the respondt·i :t~· ri•..Jit ll\· 'irttH' of .'it·dillll tiOti id' the .\et (Tr .
.
.
l the !waring of appella11t s motion to star. the

-

:;

1 •• \
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district court judge called the referee in bankruptcy tu
verify the dismissal and lack of interest of the bankruptcy court in the property. The court was ad\'ise<l at
that time that the bankruptcy court claimed no interest
in that property (Tr. 2-3).
It is clear that the lower court did not err in refusing to grant appellant's motion to stay.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COL'RT PROPERLY TERM INA TED THE CONTRACT llET\VEEN THE
PARFTIES, FOUFEITING THE HIGHTS OF
THE APPELLANT UNDER THE CONTRACT.
Appellant's contention that the court erred in sustaining the termination of the contract and the forfeiture of the appellant's rights thereunder appears to
be based on three distinct premises. First, appellant
contends that respondents ha\'e in some way waived
their right to claim a default. Second, appellant argues
that it would be inequitable to permit a forf etiure and
third, appellant claims there was no default 011 which
a forfeiture could be based. Each of these points is discussed in detail below. Appellant also raises a fourth
point, claiming that respondents unlawfully took possession of the property. It is evident that this point is
in no way relevant to respondents' right to terminate
the contract upon default since the termination of the

12

l'(J1ilr:1l·1 11 ;1-. ('lllllplekd prior lo the re-uitry. Tl1is issue
i1.-,il';1d gc1l·, to tlw appellant's right to damages as a
l'l-.:il, 111' tlH· l'L'"Jl'llllkllh alle~edly taking possession
"1· lhc 1.i·c11•: rt.1· 11.1· improper means and \\'ill, for that
n ;1-.. 111. Ill' di-,l'lh'ed 1111tkr the 11L·xt point.

Till' la 11 of l · lal1 is clear that a forfeiture clause
h
11 ai1 cd IJ\ al'l'cpti11g· late or i11adequate payments
1111dl'r a 1·c111tract rnily 111Hkr certain circ11111sla11('es. A
l'lc1>l' 1·xa111i11atic111 ol tl11· 1cry authorities cik<l by the
:,j1pdh1il i11 his llrid' 111ah.L'> this ab1111da11tly clear. The
tir-,t l'as1· cited by appella11t in support of his argullll'llt ol 1\ai1tT i-, JJc11rc·1· '" S/111rt:.:, ~ l'tali ~d 1~4, ~70
l>.:!d J.J.:! ( l\1.)-J.). Thl' L'rn1trcJ1crsy i11 that case arose
llUt of a fad -,ituatillll totally dissimilar and disti11guish:ildc t'n1111 the pn·st·11t appeal. ~n'l'rtlwless. this eourt
did rccog11i1.L' the· crilic;t! factor that lllllSt be dcmon-,tratcd hdore a \\ain'I' can he found. ,\.c:ceptance of
the pay111t·11h 11111-.;t Ile 1111dn >lll'h circ:umsta11ces and
l'ot1ditirn1-., that it \\llllld lead a reasonable person to
belic1 L' that '>trid l'ompliamT with the c:ontral't was
11ot gc1i11g to Ile req11in·d and that based uµon that
lwlil't'. the p11rcha-.n adt·d to his detrinw11t. In holding
!Ital then· "as 11C1 "ai\tT 111Hln the facb of this c:ase,
till' l'c111rt -.aid al ~iO P.:!d -1--t.;):
Ht·gardlcs'> (ii the t'!l't·d (1f the [ffm·ision of tl~e
t·o11lral'l that ;ll'l't'Jlta11l'L' (If late payments will
i1Cil co11stit11tc a \\ aiHT of the rights to payment
()Ji ..,\)t'l'ifil'd da \t-s. .
. l hl' 1-e11dce \\a .. , 11ot miskd ii it() ..,11l'l1 lll'liC"f [\)('lid that perfonna11ce of
1\w 1·ciiitr:ll'l 11cq1ld 11•1 l(1flg('I' Ill' n·q11iredl 1>1
till' 1l'1tdr1r.
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In the second case cited by appellant, Chri.Yty v.
Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 ( 1942), this court
again rejected the existence of a waiver. Though recognizing that under special circumstances a waiver might
be shown, the court in part founded its finding of a lack
of waiver on a very interesting and pertinent reason.
The contract involved in the Christy case provided in
part that "acceptance by the vendors from the Yendees
of payments thereunder other than according to the
terms of the contract would in no way alter the terms
thereof as to forfeiture." 121 P.2d at 403. In discussing
the effect of such a provision, the court cited, with
approval, the following language from the case of
Brown v. Chowchilla Land Co., 59 Cal. App. 164, 210
P. 424, 427 (1922), wherein that court discussed the
effect of a similar contract provision:
The requirement of notice after the receipt of
overdue payments without objection is based
upon the equitable consideration that by his
conduct the vendor has lead the vendee into the
belief that the former will continue to waive
the strict performance of the contract. The principle of equitable estoppel is involved. But the
reason for the rule does not exist where the
parties have expressly agreed that such waiver
shall not affect any subsequent breach or relinquish the right of the vendor to insist thereafter
upon a strict obserYance of the terms of the
contract.
The final authority cited by appellant for approYal
of its position is the Restatement of Contracts, Section
300. A full citation of that section again points out the

14

n:>ry 1iarro\\ limitation 011 the rule t:o11tende<l for IJy
appellant:
\t:t:epta11t:e of det'edi\T perfonna11ce of a condition or promise does not operate as an assent
to receive fllrtlicr similar performance ext:ept
where sllccessi\·e acecµta11ce of such performance
jllstitied the IJelief that performance of that
t:haracter is satisfactorv and induced thereb\·
the party ru1dcri11g ·1;erforma1we materiali):
changes his position.
, lt:t:cptant:e of defcdi' e installments of performance is i11suf!'it:ient evidence to justify a
belief that such performant:e is satisfactory, unle~s a reasonable person would infer from successin: at:eeptant:es that performant:e of that charader were satisfactory. That is a question the
answer to \\·hid1 <lepen<ls upon the differing
fads of each ease.
E.\amination of these authorities dearly points up
l\vo things. First, the IJuyer a11d seller may contraet
that at:t:epta11ce of ina<lequate or untimely payments
<loes not constitllte a wai,·er of the forfeiture proYi~ions llnder the contraet.
Second, in the ahsence of
such an agreement, a forfeiture provision is waiYe<l
IJy aecepta11ee of inadequate or untimely payments only
when such aeceptanee reasonably leads the purchaser
to helie\·t, that the vendor will t:onti11ue to waive the
forfeitllre dause. Furthermore. the mere acceptance
of s11eh payments. standing alone. is i11.-;uffieient eYidu1c.T of s11eh a mti,·er. \\Then tlie law as outlined ahm·e
j_., appli('d to the fads of this ea-;e. it lieeomes apparent
that tlll' Lm or \\·ainT i-, lotall>· inapplicable.
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Paragraph 5 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract ( R. l) entered into by the parties hereto, provides as follows:
It is understood and agreed that if the Seller
accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract
less than according to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter
the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated or as to any other remedies of the Seller.
The contract here clearly provides that acceptance
of inadequate payment in no way waives the vendor's
right to declare a forfeiture of the contract. Under
the rule of Christy v. Guild this fact alone is sufficient
to preclude the argument of waiver. However, even
if this clause had not been contained in the contract
between the parties, the principle of waiver would still
be inapplicable. Based upon the facts in this case, it
could not be seriously contended that respondents'
actions led the appellant to believe that strict compliance
with the contract was being waived. Respondents had
already once before tried to take possession of the
property and terminate the contract for the same basic
reasons that the present termination of the contract
was affected. Appellant could not have helped but
know of the respondents' displeasure with the payment
procedure that had been followed by the appellant.
These are hardly circumstances on which it could be
contended that the appellant had been Jed to act to his
detriment.
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The second argument advanced by the appellant
m support of his contention that the court erred in
grantiug a termination and forfeiture of the contract
is equally spurious. Although appellant's argument
that a forfeiture under the circumstances of this case
would be inequitable and therefore, improper, is not
very clearly spelled out in the brief, and has in support
thereof no citations of authority, the contention seems
to be based upon the fact that the contract recites a
down payment of $20,100, and the fact that the respondents have subsequently accepted a number of
payments under the contract. Under the circumstances,
appellant contends that such a forfeiture "would unconscionably burden the defendant." This concept seems
to be based upon a total misunderstanding and misapplication of the law on forfeiture. Appellant fails
to realize that a forfeiture under a Uniform Real Estate
Contract really inrnlves two questions. First, may the
vendor terminate the contract and forfeit all of the
vendee's rights therein { Second, may the vendor keep
the payments made under the contract as liquidated
damages 1 These are separate questions and the reasons
for permitting one and denying the other are totally
different. It is submitted that under the terms of the
contract involved in this case and under the law of
the State of Utah as clearly set forth in a great number
of decisions of this court, the vendor under a Uniform
Real Estate Contract has the right to terminate that
contract and declare the vendee's interest in the contract
fort' eited upon breach of the contract. This right is so
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clearly established, that the cases dealiug with forfeiture under a Uniform Heal Estate Contract merely
assume that right on the part of the vendor awl move
on to the second quesctiou of liquidated damages. Sec,
e.y., Christ.1; 'l'. Guild, supra; Pearce t'. Shurt:::.. supr11;
1llalmuery v. Bauyh, t>2 Utah a~n, 218 P. H75 ( rn2:3).
It is only with reference to the enforcement of the liquidated damages provision in the contract that the question of the balancing of equities comes into play. There
the court must determine whether or not the forfeiture
provision in the contract constitutes a penalty or true
damages. Furthermore. it is important to note that i11
each of those cases in ''"hich the keeping of the payments was held a penalty, the court did not declare
that the termination was rnicled, but only required the
vendor to return a portion of those payments back to
the vendee. Therefore. appellant's contention that the
contract should not have been terminated because it
was inequitable to do so is simply immaterial.
In fact, it should be pointed out that the question
of whether or not the liquidated damage provision i11
the contract between the parties hereto is enforceable
is not now before this court. A thorough search of the
record below will clearly point out that the appellant
at no time challenged the validity of that forf citme
provision in the contract nor has he at any time ever
demanded a return of a portiou of the purchase price
or payments made claiming equit~· in the property. l n
each of the cases in which this court has proceded to
determine the validity of such a forfeiture prm·isio11.
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that issue had been raised in the lower court. A review
of appellant's answer and counterclaim on file herein,
will ciearly demonstrate that uo such issue was ever
placed before the court. The law of this state is clear
that au issue not raised in the lower court may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. See e.g., Riter v.
Ca,1;Uis, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 ( 1967); In re
Ekker Estate, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967).
In fact, that is not even a problem since appellant
hasn't really raised that issue on appeal.
Appellant's final argument in support of his contention that the court was in error in sustaining a forfeiture of the contract between the parties is primarily
a factual argument. There are two very grave problems
with this argument, however. First, the facts contended
for by the appellant are wholly unsupported by the
record. Second, the trial court expressly entered a
finding of fact opposite to that now contended for
by the appellant. Appellant claims that at the time
the notice of default was filed there was in fact no
default under the contract but that the def a ult had
been created by a misapplication of funds by the
respondents. This entire argument seems to revolve
around the $4,100 settlement figure reached by the
parties hereto in settlement of the prior law suit instituted by the appellant against the respondents to regain
possession of the property. It is obvious from the record
that appellant's counsel was confused throughout the
proceedings as to what funds had been applied where.
The reeord is elear, however, that no deductions were
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made from the $4,100 figure, hut that the entirl' amou11l
was credited to the contract in behalf of the appellant
(Tr. 37). The only deductio11 made from any mo11ies
due and owing to the appellant was deductio11 of sonic
$340.42 deducted from the $1,405 in rent receipts rnllected from the property during the period between
April 15 and May 15, HHi8 (Tr. 28-30 and :J7-38 and
Exhibit P-1). Even if appellant should be gi,·en LTedit
for this additional $340.42, it would not eYen make
up the deficiency due and owing as of . April 15, l !Hi8
(Exhibit P-1). By no stretch of the imagination or
the record can appellant claim credit for the $1 ,18.J.7.3
that was in excess of thirty days delinquent in the latter
part of August, 1908 (Exhibit P-1) .
As noted above, howe,·er, the argument of appellant also has a second telling defect. On page :J of its
memorandum decision entered herein, the trial rnmt
specifically found that the appellant "had been delinquent in his installment payments o\·er a long period
of time, and specifically was in default thirty <lays in
the payment of the installment clue 011 August 15, l 9ti8 ...
(R.9). The law of this state is clear that the findings
of fact made by a trial court will not be disturbed 011
appeal if those findings are supported by any competent evidence in the record. See c.y., lda.lw State /Jani"
v. Hooper Sugar Co., 74 Ctah 24, 27ti P. ti.JU ( rn:.rn);
In re Goldsberr.IJ's Estate, 95 Ctah :379, 81 P.:!d llOti
(1938). The exhaustive statement of the facts supporting the finding of the court that the contral'l was
in default found i11 the forepart of this brief eau lean·
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little <loubt that the finding of the lower court was based
upon ample competent evidence.
The conclusion of the lower court that the appellant was in default under the contract and that as a
result thereof, the respondents were entitled to terminate the contract and forfeit the interests of the appellant in said contract was correct under both the facts
and law applicable to this case and should not, therefore, be disturbed on appeal.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT \\'AS CORRECT IN
RCLIXG THAT THE APPELLANT 'VAS
XOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES.
Although it is not entirely clear upon what basis
the appellant makes his claim for damages, there are
only two possible grounds on which damages may be
levied in an action such as this. First, a party may
claim damages as a result of his being put out of' rightful and legal possession of the premises. Second, even
if the party is not entitled to possession of the premises,
he may recover damages if the method used in evicting
him from the premises is improper or wrongful. It is
submitted that under either theory, appellant is entitled
to no damages in this case.
It is clear that appellant is not entitled to damages
fur heing put out of rightful possession either under
the forceahle entry and detainer statutes or as a private
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action for damages. Section 78-36-~ Utah Code . . t1111utated ( 1953) which is the forceable detainer statute and
the only one which appellant 11ow claims to be applicable
in this case, provides that if
in the uighttime or during the absem-c of the
occupants of any real property, [a persou) unlawfully enters thereou, and, after demand made
for the surrender thereof. refuses for the period
of three days to surreuder the same to such former occument

he is guilty of a forceable detainer. The trial court
correctly found, based upon undisputed evidence, that
the appellant did not at any time make demand for
return of the premises as required by the above quoted
section and as a result thereof was not entitled to
damages against the respondents for illegally retaining
possession of the premises ( U. 17 at pp. 5-6) .

It is also clear that appellant has no non-statutory
cause of action for damages based upon his being dispossessed of rightful possession of the property. As
pointed out in other sections of this brief, appellant
was clearly in default under the contract. Based upou
that default, respondents had the right to termina tc
the contract and forfeit appellants' interests therein.
Appropriate notices were giYen, first requiring appellant to either make good the deficiencies under the
contract or suffer a forfeiture of his interests and se<'ond, notifying the appellant of the forfeiture of hi-.
itnerests in the contract and requiring him to \·:ll'all'
the premises. Those 11otices were ig11ored and the ern1rl
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properly hel<l that the contract was terminated and the
appellant's interests therein forfeited. It is clear that
under those circumstances, appellant has no cause of
actwn fur wrongful dispossession of the property even
though the manner used in dispossesing him may have
been illegal. This is clearly pointed out by a decision
of this court which is, on this issue, almost identical to
the case now before the court. In King v. Firm, 3 Utah
2d 419, 285 P.2d 114 (1955), a tenant of certain real
property was in default under his lease-hold agreement with the landlord. Demand was made of the
tenant to pay the rent and upon his refusal to do so,
he was served with a notice of termination of the lease
for failure to pay the monthly rental. Subsequently,
the landlord entered on the premises in the absence
of the tenant, padlocked the premises and took physical
possession thereof and the tenant was refused the right
to re-enter the premises. Legal action was brought
by the tenant claiming substantial damages for the
wrongful eviction and dispossession of the property.
In holding that the tenant was not entitled to damages
for denial of possession of the property, the court made
this ,·cry pertinent limitation on the tenant's right to
damages. At 285 P.2d 1118, the court said:
.King's lease haYing bceu rightfully terminated
before respondents' wrongful entry, he by continuing to remain ill possession was holding over
wrongfully after being notified in the "t~rmi11a tion notice" to quit the premises immediately
:~i. Am . .J ur., Landlord & Tenant, Sec. 918.
King's rights in his lease having been termi23

nated and his possession thereafter wrongful,
the only damages he would be entitled to would
be fihose which would naturally result from the
wrongful taking of possession by the respondents. [Emphasis added].

If this is true, then it is evident that e\·idence concerning lost profits, reasonable rental value of the
property, etc., would be totally immaterial to the:
assessing of damages in a case such as this. The on1)
damage to which the appellant could possibly be en·
titled would be that damage which resulted from the
actual physical taking of the property. It is equally
clear that appellant is not entitled to any damages
arising from such a wrongful taking.
Damages under this second theory could be levied
only if the taking was, in fact, wrongful. In support
of such a contention, appellant points to an alleged
finding of the trial court that respondents took possession of the premises in violation of Section 78-3u-:.?
Utah Code Annotated ( 1953). Let us examine for
just a moment the actual finding made by the trial
court and the import thereof. On page 5 of its memorandum decision (R. IO), the court did find that the
"entry of plaintiffs was in violation of Section 2 of
78-36-2." The court goes on, however, to indicate what
in fact it really meant. The entry of respondents came
within the purview of that section of the statute because
it included "an entry 'during the absence of the occupants of any real property.' " The lower court did not
necessarily mean to imply that respondents' entry was
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illegal or wrongful. All that was clearly intended was
to point out that the entry was made in the absence of
the oecupa11t of the real property. Does entry in the
absence of the occupant necessarily make the entry
illegal and the one that would create in appellant some
right of reeovery ,~ It is clear that it does not.
Since at common law a landlord or vendor had the
absolute right to re-enter property and dispossess a
defaulting tenant or vendee, so long as excessive force
was not used, (see King v. Finn, .r1upra), such an entry
now is illegal only if it is in violation of some provision
of the forceable entry and detainer statutes. The law
under those statutes is clear that when a landlord or
vendor enters the property with the consent, either
implied or expressed, of the tenant or vendee, there is
no violation of the statutes. In the case of Seeley v.
HouJJton, 105 Utah 202, 141 P.2d 880 (1943), an
action had been brought under the forceable entry and
detainer statutes. There was some confusion as to
whether or not the plaintiff had been in actual possession of the premises prior to the entry of the defendant.
In approaching that issue, the court made the following interesting comment at 141 P.2d 881:
However, it matters not who is in possession
five days before, or for that matter, the date that
defendants moved onto the land, if thev did so
with the consent, expressed or implied·, of the
person then in possession. In other words, lack
of plaintiff's consent is also an element of the
action.
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This same point was made by Justice Crockett in his
concurring opinion in the decision of Shoemaker t'.
Pioneer Investments, 14 Utah 2d 250, 381 P.2<l rn5
( 1963), where he pointed out that there was nu violation of the statute if the entry was made after the
premises had been voluntarily vacated. At :-381 P.2d
737, he said:
In the present case the defendant has voluntarily vacated the premises and thus we are not
concerned with the right to possession and the
provisions of 78-36-3 relating to unlawful detainer are not applicable.
This court also reiterated that position in King t'. Firm,
supra, when the court correctly pointed out that the
forceable entry and detainer statutes are only applicable
when the person in possession has refused to vacate the
premises. At 258 P.2d 1118, the court said:
A landlord who is entitled to possession must,
on the refusal of the tenant to surrender the
premises, resort to the remedy giYen by law to
secure it. [Emphasis added].
If the appellant in this case either voluntarily
vacated the premises pursuant to the notice given by
the respondents or impliedly consented to the respondents' taking possession of the property, then appella11t
now has no grounds upon which to complain that the
taking of said property was wrongful. The undisputed
facts in this case clearly point to the fact that appellant
either voluntarily vacated the premises or impliedly
consented to respondents taking possession. The re-
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spoudent Thompson testified that prior to taking possession (lf the property on or about September 20,
Hlli8, he 1nade effort to find l\lr. Brewster on the
premises to discuss these matters with him, but could
not locate him (Tr. 9-10 and 20) . Mr. Thompson also
made effort to discover if anyone had been left in
charge of the premises and determined that there was
uo management at all. He did discover that a Mrs.
~lead had collected some rents for Mr. Brewster, but
her responsibilities did not go beyond that (Tr. 20:.n). It was only after these attempted contacts that
~Ir. Thompson took physical control of the property
(Tr. 21) ..Mrs. Joyce Mead, the individual who had
been collectiug the rents in behalf of Mr. Brewster,
testified that three or four days after l\lr. Thompson
took possession of the property, Mr. Brewster telephoned her at which time he was informed that Mr.
Thompson had taken possession of the property (Tr.
106). Even though l\lr. Brewster knew of the possession of the respondents, he did not make any effort
to contact the respondents to request they turn possession of the property back to him. His own testimony
indicated that he made two trips to the property in
September after respondents ha<l taken possession, and
three more in October. No effort was made on any
trip to contact anyone concerning possession of the
property (Tr. 87). 'Vhat do these facts indicate? l\lr.
Brewster had been served with a notice to vacate the
premises. Four or fiYe clays after sen·ice of that notice,
the respondent Thompson went to the property to try
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to locate Brewster to talk to him about the matter. The
appellant was no where to be found. The responde11t
Thompson checked around the premises aud fouu<l
that no one had been left in charge of the premises
but that a .Mrs . .Mead did have some arrangement with
the appellant to collect the rents. The respondent drew
a most reasonable inference - the appellant had n>luntarily vacated the premises - and as a result took
physical control thereof. On the other hand, even if
it could be contended that appellant had not vacated
the premises, certainly his actions indicate an acquiescensce and implied consent in the taking by the
respondents. No demand was ever made of any of the
respondents to return to the premises. The appellant
never at any time complained either to any of the
respondents or to anyone on the premises even though
he visited the premises some five times to "look around."
It is true that appellant tried subsequently to make
one payment which fell far short of the deficiency under
the contract. That payment was properly rejected by
the respondents and appellant made no complaint about
the rejection of the payment and still made no demand
for return of the premises. The least that can be said
from these facts is that the appellant ratified the action
taken by the respondents and give his implied consent
to their possession of the property.
On the other hand, even if respondents' taking
of the property was wrongful, the appellant has shown
a right to nothing more than nominal damages. :\gain
the decision of this court in King v. Finn, supra, seems
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particularly pertinent. In that case, the taking by the
respond~ nts \Vas of a much more aggravated nature
thau that iuvo!Yed here. There, not only did the landlord come out and take physical possession of the
premises, but padlocked all the doors and physically
excluded the tenant from possession thereof. The
tenant vigorously opposed this action and expressly
requested permission to reenter and take possession
of certain personal belongings that were left on the
premises. That request was refused by the landlord.
There was clearly no acquiescence or consent involved
in that case. But even under those aggravated circumstances, the court held that the tenant had failed to
prove any damages. The unlawful taking had in no
way physically injured the tenant or destroyed or damaged any property belonging to the tenant. The tenant
had not been dispossessed of any property to which he
was rightfully entitle<!. On that basis, the court held
that the taking was in fact wrongful but that the tenant
was entitled to only nominal damages in the amount
of $1.00. If this court should find that the taking by
the respondents in this case was in fact wrongful, it is
submitted that the rationale of King v. Firm is
controlling here. Appellant has shown absolutely no
damages which resulted directly from the taking of
the property itself. Ample opportunity was given to
the appellant by the trial court to pursue any and all
lines of <lamage that he may have suffered but no evident"e whatsoever was introduced on this question.
1\ppella11t has Juul his day in court and the most to
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which he could conceivably be entitled would be nominal damages in the amount of $1.00.

CONCLUSION
Appellant has vigorously argued that the equities
are in his favor and for that reason judgment shoul<l
be granted in his behalf. A closer examination of the
facts, however, reveal that appellant has not approached
this court with clean hands and that the decision made
by the trial court below was in every respect correct
and proper. An examination of the record reveals that
for the eleven months that this contract of sale was in
existence, appellant did not make one single or full
payment under that contract. Every $300 check sent
by the appellant to the respondents was returned
marked insufficient funds (Tr. 11). 'Vhen respondents
finally concluded that appellant simply was not going
to comply with the payment requirements under the
contract, legal notice was given appellant to either make
up the deficiencies under the contract or suffer a forfeiture. For twelve days, that notice went totally
unheeded until finally appellant was served with a notice
on September 16, 1968 to vacate the premises. Appellant now stands before this court and says in effect that
even though I have never made a full payment under
the contract, and even though most of the checks I
have sent to the respondents in payment under the
contract have been drawn on insufficient funds, and
even though I have ignored their demands for full
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payment under the contract, it is not fair for them to
take this property from me. It is submitted that the
eyuitics uf this position speak for themselves.
Repectfully submitted,
John A. Rokich
9120 West 2700 South
Magna, Utah
and
Glen E. Davies
400 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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